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ABSTRACT 
This paper is the latest in a series of articles I have written to conceptualize an 
alternative to the distributive paradigm espoused by the environmental justice 
movement. It is clear that early studies such as the "Toxic Waste and Race in the 
United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic 
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites" prepared by the 
Commission for Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ exposed the 
potential our present model of environmental regulation has to create 
distributional inequities and forced policymakers to identify how the burdens as 
well as the benefits of environmental protection are spread among groups of 
persons. 
 
It is also clear to me that distributive theories of environmental justice are 
inadequate to justify a more just environmental policy or support the aims of the 
environmental justice movement. I share with Iris Marion Young a view that the 
distributive paradigm's implicit assumption that social judgments are about what 
individual person have, how much they have, and how that amount compares 
with what other persons have and the belief that this focus on possession is 
limiting. Distributive theories of justice tend to preclude thinking about what 
people are doing according to what institutionalized rules, how their doings and 
havings are structured by institutionalized relations that constitute their positions, 
and how the combined effects of their doings has recursive effects on their lives. 
What I attempt to do in this paper is to shift the focus of the discussion away 
from the distribution and on the decision-making structures and procedures 
which determine what there is to distribute, how it gets distributed, who 
distributes and what the distributive outcome is. To paraphrase Ms. Young, 
environmental injustice occurs not simply because some persons have cleaner air 
and water than others environmental injustice derives as much from the 
corporate and legal structures and procedures that give some persons the power 
to make decisions that affect millions of other people.2 
 
A. THE DISTRIBUTE RHETORIC OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE 
The ideology of the environmental justice movement is evolving and untested and, from 
its beginnings to the present, has been described in distributive terms, e.g., "[p]eople of 
color throughout the United States are receiving more than their fair share of the 
poisonous fruits of industrial production"3 or, "[t]he incorporation of environmental 
justice strategies at the local, agency, and national levels in respect to the cleanup process 
at federal facilities strives to: . . . level the playing field in cases where communities of 
color and low-income communities have had to bear a disproportionate share of 
environmental and economic degradation."4 And, "[t]he nation's environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies have not been applied fairly across all segments of the 
population. Some individuals, groups, and communities receive less protection than 
others because of the geographic, location, race, and economic status."5 (Emphasis 
added.) 
The environmental justice movement has enjoyed some success. Not only federal 
environmental protection policies and practices are being scrutinized for distributional 
inequities, but those of mainstream environmental organizations as well.6 Not 
surprisingly, the federal response has likewise been couched in distributive terms. In 
1994 President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, "Federal Actions to Address 
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations" which 
directs federal agencies to develop environmental justice strategies that identify and 
address disproportionately high exposure and adverse human health or environmental 
effects of their programs, policies and activities on communities of color and low-income 
populations.7 (Emphasis added.) 
The distributive vocabulary of Executive Order 12898 has led the U.S. Department of 
Energy to base its response in similar terms. Using geography on one hand, and on race 
or ethnicity on the other, the DOE identifies defines communities situated within a certain 
distance from one of its facilities or within a certain distance of proposed transportation 
corridors as affected. If the affected communities include large sub-communities of racial 
or ethnic minorities, the DOE then attempts to discern if such sub-communities are 
disproportionately affected. This is the beauty and simplicity of the distributive 
paradigm its ability to accommodate any issue of justice by simply formulating the 
issue in terms of the distribution of some material or nonmaterial good among various 
agents. Any social value can be treated as some thing or aggregate of things that some 
specific agents possess in certain amounts and alternative end-state patterns of 
distribution of that good among those agents can be compared.8 But therein also lie the 
limitations of the distributive theory of environmental justice. 
B. THE LIMITS OF THE DISTRIBUTIVE PARADIGM OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
Distributive theorists of justice agree that justice is the primary normative concept for 
evaluating all aspects of social institutions, but at the same time they along with many 
environmental justice theorists identify the scope of justice with distribution. This entails 
applying a logic of distribution to social goods which are not material things or 
measurable quantities and results in situations or actions similar to the extremely narrow 
definition of "affectedness" used by the U.S. Department of Energy to determine if it will 
have to accommodate the concerns of the affected community. According to Ms. Young, 
applying a logic of distribution to such goods produces a misleading conception of the 
issues of justice involved. It reifies aspects of social life that are better understood as a 
function of rules and relations than as things. And it conceptualizes social justice 
primarily in terms of end-state patterns, rather than focusing on social processes.9 
The limitations of the distributive paradigm are even more pronounced as it is applied in 
the context of environmental protection decision-making in the United States. In the 
environmental protection context, the distributive paradigm implicitly assumes that social 
judgments are about what kind of exposure to contaminants, toxins or emissions 
individual persons experience, how much exposure they experience, and how that amount 
compares with what other persons experience. This focus on possession tends to preclude 
thinking about what people are doing, according to what institutionalized rules, how their 
doings and havings are structured by institutionalized relations that constitute their 
positions, and how the combined effect of their doings has recursive effects on their 
lives.10 
1. THE DISTRIBUTIVE PARADIGM IGNORES THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY 
FRAMEWORK OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING 
Environmental protection in the United States is generally accomplished through a 
licensing or permitting procedure whereby the licensee or permitee is authorized by a 
government agency to construct, manufacture, operate, or take any other action provided 
that such action does not emit, discharge or release pollutants in quantities exceeding the 
levels authorized in the permit. The typical permitting procedure requires notice and 
comment that is generally embedded in federal, state or tribal administrative procedure 
laws. The first step consists of a company completing and submitting lengthy application 
forms supported by lengthier technical support documents. Many companies use the 
services of engineering consulting firms and specialized legal counsel at this juncture. 
After an application is submitted, a federal, state or tribal environmental agency 
employee will review the application for completeness. If complete, the agency will 
assign a permit writer to draft a permit. 
Once the agency has drafted a permit that it believes satisfies all legal requirements, it 
formally issues the draft permit to the company, notifies the public, and invites comments 
from the company and the public. After the comment period closes, the permit writer 
reviews and responds to all comments and revises the draft permit, after which the 
agency undertakes a final review and issues the final permit. If the permittee or the public 
takes still objects to the issuance of the permit, they may appeal the final agency action 
first, with an administrative agency and subsequently, with a court.  
The power to influence the permitting of a particular discharge or the construction of a 
factory or waste management facility is generally exercised by a widely dispersed 
network of agents mediating the decisions of legal, technical, scientific and other experts. 
These agents can include attorneys and consultants retained by governmental agencies, 
corporations and public interests groups and environmental organizations. To that extent 
many people have some power in relation to others, even though they lack the absolute 
power to decide policies or results. However, the institutional context is not limited to 
agents. It includes also, any structures or practices, the rules and norms that guide them, 
and the language and symbols that mediate social interactions within them.  
Some of the aims of the environmental movement at once recognizes the "otherness" of 
the environmental protection institution and entreats it to become less different. For 
example, the Principles of Environmental Justice issued by the First National People of 
Color Environmental Leadership Summit declared, inter alia, that "environmental justice 
demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice for all people, free 
from any form of discrimination or bias, and demands the right to participate as equal 
partners at every level of decision-making including needs assessment, planning, 
implementation, enforcement and evaluation."11 If these principles accurately describe 
the aspirations of the environmental justice movement, then environmental injustice 
attaches not only when the community lacks both the absolute authority or power even in 
this mediated sense to influence the permitting or siting decisions, but also when the 
myriad networks of agents and processes that comprise the environmental protection 
institution in the United States excludes the community's participation or when such 
participation is less than fully knowing and informed.12 The distributive paradigm of 
environmental justice and its focus on end-state patterns is not useful in suggesting and 
justifying the means by which these institutional processes and relationships can be recast 
to be more environmentally just. 
C. ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
If the distributive paradigm leads us to an ideological dead-end, what is the alternative? 
In an earlier paper,13 I suggested that the challenge facing the environmental justice 
movement was to articulate an alternative philosophy that will support a more just 
environmental policy and the aims of the environmental justice movement. Here I 
suggest some elements that might be considered in developing that philosophy.  
1. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REQUIRES JUST DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES 
AND PROCEDURES 
The means are more important than the ends. More artfully stated, "the consequences" or 
"good" brought about by an action should not be our only concern in moral matters; 
rather, we should be constrained by rules and duties that are binding on us prior to and 
notwithstanding the consequences or "good" brought about by an action.14 The basic idea 
is that whatever ends we wish to pursue, we cannot violate certain basic rules about how 
we ought to treat each other while pursuing these goals. My sense is that we need to 
examine the formal and informal networks of relationships and processes that make up 
our environmental protection institutions and engage in rational discourse to formulate 
the just procedures by which these institutions can achieve just ends. 
2. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REQUIRES EMPOWERMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS 
Beyond examining the workings of the environmental protection institutions and 
establishing just procedures, it seems to me that the environmental justice suggests not 
only community participation in these procedures but also a co-equal standing in the 
participatory process. This idea is embedded in much of the environmental justice 
literature. In the federal facility environmental restoration context for example: "[a]n 
additional obligation is that [tribal consultation and participation in federal facility 
environmental decision-making] should be knowing and informed." These obligations 
form the basis for building tribal capacity. Consistent with the government-to-
government relationship that exists between the federal government and Indian tribes, the 
Committee recommends that specific tribal capacity building programs be negotiated by 
the relevant federal agencies and Indian tribes.15 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IS CULTURALLY EGALITARIAN 
An interesting dynamic occurs when communities clash with agents of the environmental 
institutions. Iris Marion Young terms this phenomenon "cultural imperialism." In a 
discussion where the participants come from different cultural and social groups, and 
where some groups have greater symbolic or material privilege than others, appeals to a 
'common good' are likely to perpetuate such privilege. . . . When discussion participants 
aim at unity, the appeal to a common good, in which they are all supposed to leave 
behind their particular experience and interests, the perspectives of the privileged are 
likely to dominate the definition of that common good. The less privileged are asked to 
put aside their claims of entitlement or interest must be put aside for the sake of a 
common good whose definition is biased against them.16 
According to Ms. Young, cultural imperialism involves the paradox of experiencing 
oneself as invisible at the same time that one is marked out as different. The invisibility 
comes about when dominant groups fail to recognize the perspective embodied in their 
cultural expressions as a perspective. These dominant cultural expressions often simply 
have little place for the experience of other groups, at most only mentioning or referring 
to them in stereotyped or marginalized ways. This, then, is the injustice of cultural 
imperialism: that the oppressed group's own experience and interpretation of social life 
finds little expression that touches the dominant culture, while that same culture imposes 
on the oppressed group its experience and interpretation of social life.17 
An excellent example of cultural imperialism is cited by E.T. Durie, of the Maori Land 
Court in New Zealand. "Some decades ago, a Maori elder appeared before the court on a 
claim of ownership to the Whanganui riverbed, did no more than sing a song of the river. 
The court noted that he sang a song but had nothing to say. It was, of course, usual for a 
people without a Land Transfer Office to assert their ownership in their own ways and 
the old man was simply singing his title in customary style. His song was a declaration of 
ownership."18  
D. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The environmental justice movement is young and its ideology is yet evolving. It takes its 
ideology from the lessons and its rhetoric from the civil rights movement. Unequal, 
unfair, disproportionately impacted these are all, to some degree or another, accurate 
characterizations of the affects our environmental protection system has had on some 
communities of color. The response to such distributional characterizations in the civil 
and human rights arena was to establish affirmative action and other preferential 
programs to redistribute income, employment and opportunities. The legislative and 
judicial backlash against these programs seems to me a fair indication of the bankruptcy 
of such distributive paradigms. The backlash does not negate the real distributive 
inequities, but it does implicate the use of such theories and rhetoric in formulating 
lasting responses to remedy these inequities. 
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